The Imagined Conquest of Japan
I had a strange experience a few weeks ago.
I was responding to (mostly positive) comments about my recent video on the history of the colonization of Hokkaido, when a Japanese user appeared with a lengthy, academic critique.
His main argument was that the Ainu, the native people of Hokkaido, were not in fact indigenous – that their indigeneity, taken for granted by my video and recently enshrined into law in Japan, was a falsehood. The Ainu, he argued, shared ancestors with the modern Yamato Japanese via the ancient Jomon people. Thus, they could not be considered indigenous to Hokkaido.
When I pointed out that a single distant shared ancestor from hazy eons past could hardly erase the historic, linguistic, and cultural separateness of the Ainu from the Japanese (who had long abused, enslaved, and othered the Ainu), he responded that the very idea of “indigenous people” was a Western invention being foisted upon Japan in order to harm the country. The Ainu had struggled for decades to receive official recognition from the Japanese government. But in this person’s mind, that very recognition – and promises to help conserve the moribund Ainu language – was a poison pill. “Lazy” Ainu and people claiming to be Ainu would pop out of the woodwork looking for government handouts. (Sound familiar?)
As I continued to point out that none of this was an argument against the historical reality of the Ainu (who were consistently recognized as something other than “Japanese” by both themselves and the Yamato), my interlocutor finally let slip the ultimate source of his anxiety over this subject.
The recognition of the Ainu, he told me, was in fact nothing other than a plot by Japan’s most dangerous, insidious enemy: China. That country, he claimed, was controlling the Japanese media, with Japanese politicians all held in its pocket. The belated recognition of the Ainu was simply the first step in a Chinese plot to divide and conquer Japan. Once they had shamed Japan on the world stage for the mistreatment of the indigenous Ainu (and, later, Okinawan) peoples, they would begin funding separatist movements. Eventually, both Hokkaido and Okinawa would declare independence from a meek Japan, cowed by moralizing international opinion. Japan would be reduced, weakened, and would eventually be broken up into smaller and smaller parts. Only then would China begin the full-on invasion.
The fact that there are only 25,000 self-proclaimed Ainu in the world against 5 million Japanese living on Hokkaido made little difference in this person’s mind. The Ainu were an easy sacrifice to make on the alter of Japanese unity against an encroaching China.
The Spector of China
I bring up this interaction as a representation of so much of what is going on in Japanese discourse regarding their largest neighbor.
Of course, the idea that the ever-more-powerful Chinese state might want to sow discord in Japan is not ridiculous in of itself. Countries the world over fret over the idea of Chinese economic encroachment – the huge investments and loans given to African governments are often called “the new colonialism.” Meanwhile, the Chinese navy prowls the South China Sea, pushing its maritime border deeper into contested waters. Barack Obama’s “American Factory” documentary from 2019 places a dim light on Chinese corporations’ entrance into the US countryside. In Hokkaido itself, Chinese companies are buying up land and proposing mass immigration. These are all things worthy of being wary of.
And yet, in Japan (as elsewhere), anxiety about China often takes the form of the hysterical, the conspiratorial, and – indeed – the xenophobic. China, the country with which Japan has consistently shared its most intimate, complicated, and troubled relationship, is now often seen as an implacable enemy – and irreversibly “anti-Japanese.”
Now, in the age of COVID-19, these anxieties and not-so-latent prejudices have come even more to the fore. While much of the world outside of East Asia has seen increased incidents of racist attacks towards East Asian-presenting individuals over their perceived ties to COVID-19’s origins (with a surprising number of people, seemingly including American President Trump, going so far as to imply or outright state that the disease had been purposefully engineered by the Chinese government[1]), Japan itself has seen cases of foreigners being associated with the disease – and especially with Chinese individuals. Whereas a Japanese national abroad may be lumped in with “Chinese” as assumed disease vectors, in Japan the same sort of scrutiny is still placed upon Chinese individuals, among various “others.”
This appears as just one part of the stigmatization of China and Chinese within Japan that has been occurring in the past two decades. This endures despite the mutually beneficial and extremely intertwined economic relationship that the two countries – the world’s second and third largest economies – share. Both states are tied together via flows of capital, manpower, immigration, and cultural exchange. Yet these exact connections (already disdained by some anti-Chinese nationalists) now arise as the port through which COVID is seen to embark into Japan.
Was it always bound to be this way?
A Unique Relationship
It’s well-know that the relationship between the nations of China and Japan is ancient and complicated. This bilateral relationship remains of great importance to both the history of Japan and its modern reality. Much of Japanese society, art, culture, written language, and vocabulary find their initial basis in influence from their giant neighbor to the west.
Indeed, China has always loomed large over the leaders of Japanese history. The great Chinese empires were the measure by which many compared their success as a nation, both in terms of governance and in terms of their perceived “civilization.”
In the modern era, an emergent Japan sought to dominate and even colonize large swaths of China throughout the 1890s up until the end of WWII. China, once an impossibly powerful and intimidating figure to japan, was seen to have become weak. Continually embarrassed by Western powers, many in Japan considered the country to no longer be worthy of their admiration. Japan waged two wars on China during this period: the First Sino-Japanese War (1894 – 1895) resulted in Japanese victory against the Qing Empire, leading to costly concessions, and; the Second Sino-Japanese War, waged primarily against the Republic of China from 1937 -1945, and which ended with Japan’s defeat in World War II.
During this period, Japan took advantage of the breakdown of centralized Chinese state power to sponsor the forceful creation of puppet states from within China borders. Most famous of these was the vast Manchukuo state, upon which the Japanese military placed former Qing emperor Puyi as figurehead. Areas occupied by the Japanese army experienced well-documented mass-scale atrocities, and the Second Sino-Japanese War is believed to have resulted in between ten to twenty-five million Chinese civilians perishing either directly from the war, or from famines which have been tied to it.
Such a dramatic and emotionally resonant conflict from within living memory continues to play a major role in both Chinese and Japanese identity and foreign relations. The emergence of nationalism in both countries involves responses to this shared wartime past, focusing on opposing narratives about WWII and Japan’s nature in the years since. The past two decades in particular have seen a rise in negative feelings from the people of one country towards the other.
Interestingly, in the preceding decades, China was far from Japan’s “public enemy #1.” In fact, much of the reason for the current fixation on China as a foe comes not just from Chinese aggressiveness (such as mass, state-sponsored anti-Japanese rioting), but from China’s refusal to acknowledge Japan’s own narratives of self-identity.
Post-War Miracle
Japanese identity has gone through a surprising number of shifts in the post-war years. Perhaps the most important story told within Japan is one about how unprecedentedly Japan emerged from complete devastation, reaching a unique level of economic and social success. Although the immediate post-war and occupation years were marked by a deep social ennui (at times in an almost pathologic form, known as kyodatsu/虚脱) and the tabooing of nationalism and traditionalism (seen as at fault for leading Japan to ruin), the impressive economic and societal rebound saw this anti-nationalism fading away by the early 1980s.
Caroline Rose, Professor of Sino-Japanese Relations at the University of Leeds, had the following to say about the shifting perceptions on nationalism:
“Foreign and Japanese academics began to argue that traditional values in fact provided the key to understanding the Japanese ‘economic miracle’, producing a huge output of ‘success literature’ which stressed Japan’s uniqueness and hailed Japan as a role model for Western and Asian economies.”
In other words, by the 1980s many in Japan believed they were once again somehow unique among Asian countries. Much like in the pre-war years, Japan seemed to be the lone Asian power to be accepted as part of the Western world. (interestingly, from a Chinese nationalist perspective, Japan is often lumped in with the “West” in anti-Western literature.)
In the 1980s, Japan was emerging as an economic power that might well eclipse the former hegemons of the international community. American and European literature and media began showing obvious signs of anxiety over a future ruled by Japanese overlords. (Blade Runner and Black Rain are two such examples.) For some in Japan, their national right as natural leaders of Asia had again been reified. Pride in Japan and being Japanese was back in fashion. Opinion polls revealed a Japanese populace who thought themselves to have emerged beyond the need for “foreign role models.”
Still, even at the height of Japan’s economic might, China was rarely vilified. Both Japan and China went through similar waves of strengthened nationalism during the 1980s and ‘90s, but both nationalisms came from a sense of inward pride – not from stacking up against a designated enemy.
As a result, these decades saw few breakdowns in the Sino-Japanese relationship and less authorship within Japan depicting China as an enemy or, as it would later be branded, “anti-Japanese.” Wartime misdeeds were rarely focused on in one way or the other. Japan did not yet feel the need to justify wartime atrocities, and China was rarely mentioned in parliamentary debate on the topic of “anti-Japanism,” nor was China the subject of any books on the same topic up until 2002.
Most Peaceful of Nations
Things began to change markedly into the 2000s, in the age following the burst of the Japanese economic bubble and the end of Japan’s image of a future in which it reigned as the world’s economic supreme.
The reason for this change is located in the issue of Japan’s self-identity. Modern Japanese internal narratives focus on one extremely important facet: an identity for Japan as a peace-loving changed country. Japanese leaders in the post-war period have continually engaged in discourse that marks Japan as one of the world’s most peaceful countries. In order to do so, they draw upon the nature of the famous Article 9 of the post-war constitution – an article that forbids Japan from having a standing offensive military or engaging in any bellicose actions without first being attacked.
This self-image of having emerged from defeat in war to became a better, uniquely peaceful and prosperous country is something that is now at the heart of modern Japanese identity, something stressed by prime minister after prime minister in speeches to China and the international community. For example, take a look at this part of speech by Prime Minister Murayama from 1995 on the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII:
“The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens.”
Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, Speech: “On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the War’s end,” 1995
Similar statements were made by prime ministers Hashimoto Ryutaro (1997), Koizumi Junichiro (2001 and 2005), Abe Shinzo (during his first term in 2006), and Fukuda Yasuo (2007). A oft-quoted line from a speech by Koizumi is worth look at here as well:
“In the post-war period, Japan has become the world’s second largest economic power. Never turning into a military power and always observing pacifism, Japan has played an active role in achieving world peace and prosperity by contributing financially, such as through Official Development Assistance and contributions to the UN, and by personnel contributions, such as participation in UN peacekeeping operations.”
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, 2005
This sort of self-narration allows Japanese identity to bridge the gap between a terrible defeat in devastating war and a positive self-image; it allows the deprivations of World War II to be a single chapter in the nation’s story, and one from which Japan emerged to become something better, to become what it was perhaps always meant to be.
China: Enemy by Omission
Exactly because this is such a healing narrative for Japan, the idea that outsiders would ignore it becomes difficult to bear. For some in Japan, China and the Koreas are often seen as the worst perpetrators here. All three countries have “hurt” Japanese self-identity as a “peaceful nation” by continually focusing attention on Japan’s wartime past and the crimes committed in that era, and refusing to reinforce Japan’s self-image as a changed country. Because China will not acknowledge all the progress Japan believes it has made, China manages to somehow damage what has become a core component of Japanese national identity. For some Japanese people who stake their identity on this, it’s as though China is attempting to will that healing aspect of the Japanese national psyche out of existence.
As a result, undemocratic China is seen as an entity against which good-faith arguments are useless. China is a state apart – not a country that can be trusted or argued with using facts or intellectual arguments. It is essentially “anti-Japanese (反日),” a country and a people who have it out for Japan, whose very identity is affirmed by a stance against Japan and a nationalism that paints Japan not simply as a one-time enemy, but as one which essentially has not changed since WWII. If China is “anti-Japanese,” then the only recourse is to continually point this fact out. In fact, an entire genre of Japanese authorship now exists to do just that – many Japanese bookstores have designated anti-China and anti-Korean bookshelves repeating such narratives.
Nationalists view the issue thusly: All of Japan’s allies, the other countries through whose perception Japan judges itself, must be made aware time and again that China is a bigoted, authoritarian country that seeks to spread libel against Japan for its own purposes. This is an atmosphere where China is associated not only with anti-Japanese riots and bitter wartime grudges but also with continually spreading “mistruths” about Japan into the international ether.
This damages Japanese self-identity in the eyes of the countries of whose opinion Japanese nationals might most value (the US and Europe, essentially). It also makes sense that China continues to be seen as antagonistic, scheming, and even evil by many within Japan – especially those for whom nationalism and pride in country is a major part of their identities. That such people would latch on to anger towards China in a time period of unprecedented anxiety and worry over a pandemic originating in that country also seems to make sense.
By “othering” China not only from Japan itself but from fellow democracies and allies, Japanese people can feel less and less concerned about Chinese perceptions of Japan. After all, some may think, these perceptions have come about as the result of the antagonism of a bad-faith agent; an entity for whom all should take its statements with more than a grain of salt.
Taking it to the E-Streets: Rise of the Netto-Uyo
This attempt at othering China and Chinese people as a whole takes on an especially visible (and often odious) form in two spaces: street-side political rallies and the online sphere.
The street rallies are something most anyone who’s spent time in Japan has seen; large black vans draped in Japanese flags, signs baring anti-foreign, pro-imperial slogans fluttering in the wind; loudspeakers blaring hateful rhetoric at volumes that seem like they must be in violation of some sort of noise ordinance. These rallies are usually put on by one sort of Uyoku Dantai (右翼団体, far-right group), often associated with the yakuza.
Meanwhile, much of the rampant ultra-nationalism seen in online Japanese spaces originates from the infamous 2-Channel (or 2-Chan for short), which Dr. Rumi Sakamoto of the University of Auckland called an “…unmoderated forum…known to be the main outlet for revisionism and xenophobic neonationalism of the internet generation.” As of 2011, 2-Chan was receiving a massive 10 million users per day, making it Japan’s most visited “online community.” The site can easily be compared to its equally infamous inspirational offspring, 4chan, in that the board is completely anonymous and features talk on innumerable topics, many benign, but often devolving into rampant racism, sexism, xenophobia, and hate speech.
The massive 2-Chan has become a haven for the so-called netto-uyo (Net Right/ネット右翼), where they “…exhibit xenophobia towards immigrants, depict Korea and China negatively, and uphold revisionist history, justifying and glorifying Japan’s wartime actions.”
While netto-uyo often engage in doxxing, as well as in concentrated negative commenting meant to overwhelm left-leaning publications they dislike, they tend to stay true to their 2-Chan origins of anonymity. Most of the netto-uyo now on internationally visible platforms like Twitter still hide behind cartoon avatars and usernames rather than revealing themselves. (The fact that this anonymity means that the actual ethnicity or nationality of the poster is essentially unknowable is likely a lost irony).
While on-the-streets right wing activists (like those seen at the street rallies) sometimes bemoan the netto-uyo’s in-words-only political actions, it’s clear than their discourse (like that of racist trolls in the US in the lead up to the 2016 election) does have its effects.
Typical netto-uyo threads focus on propping up an “other,” unusually Chinese or Koreans, as an evil, subhuman boogeyman onto which to direct hate, scorn, and derision, and by which the netto-uyo can feel superior by dint of their innate Japanese qualities. Rumi Sakamoto describes these settings thusly: “‘we Japanese’ are portrayed as a moral, rational, polite and too tolerant people who are being taken advantage of—and victimized by—the Other’s aggression, slyness and lack of morality.” By comparison, the other (in this case referring to Koreans, but Chinese are often given similar treatment) “…are associated with excrement, rubbish, public urination, stealing, prostitution, violence, illegal activity and obscenity,” and are shown to be “…violent, unethical, overly emotional and irrational people, who are a ‘threat’ to Japan.”
When such virulent language is used to discuss the “Other” even during normal times, does it come as a surprise that such “dirty” foreigners and their bad habits would receive blame from the same online commentators during a period of global pandemic?
Japan, China, and COVID-19
The official reaction towards China from Japan during the COVID crisis has been mixed. Words of cooperation and of jointly taking on the virus have been exchanged between governmental officials from both nations. Additionally, Prime Minister Abe refused to stoop towards blaming China for the worldwide pandemic, unlike his American counterpart (with whom he shares a generally good relationship).
In February, Diet members from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) even donated part of their monthly salaries to China to help fight the virus. When Japanese individuals and NGOs donated masks, gloves, and more to China during the worst hours of its crisis, the Chinese foreign ministry assured that they would pay back Japan’s “friendship and trust.” Donations also flowed in from the Chinese government and private individuals during the quarantine of the veritable “plague ship,” the Diamond Princess.
However, the Abe government also began urging Japanese companies with bases in-country to pull out of China, offering ¥220 billion worth of loans to companies willing to shift operations to Japan (and even offering ¥23.5 billion to those who would move to countries other than China). On the other hand, entry into Japan has been almost completely shut off to non-nationals – including Chinese and other official residents who were outside of Japan and the time of the cut-off.
Hate in the Time of COVID
Publicly, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has seen a wave of strengthened and highly publicized xenophobia towards Chinese individuals. This often echoes the usual anti-Chinese/anti-Korean sentiments regularly heard on nationalistic web boards; this time, however, it can be seen spilling out into more normalized venues.
Japanese Twitter users have been seen labeling Chinese people as “’dirty’ and ‘insensitive’ and…call[ing] them ‘bioterrorists.’” In February, the hashtag #中国人は日本に来るな(#ChineseDontCometoJapan) began trending on twitter. This hashtag, mainly aimed towards curbing Chinese tourism (which has expanded greatly over the past decade, sparking frustration, anxiety, and derision within nationalist circles, despite increasing tourism being a major goal of the Abe administration) as the virus infection rates began heating up. It has sometimes taken on the guise of seemingly rational frustration targeting slow-moving Japanese government reactions towards the disease, such as this example:
“Isn’t the reason for the large number of infected people really the lax judgment of the government? If they don’t hurry up and prohibit the entrance of Chinese into the country, it’ll just continue to grow. More and more Japanese people who come in contact with Chinese tourists at work will become infected. It’ll be unavoidable and unpardonable. Despite this, Chinese tourists come into the country one after another.
#ChineseDontCometoJapan
#ProhibitChineseEnteringTheCountry”
The rhetoric could be seen spilling over into general assessments of China and dealing with Chinese citizens in ways unrelated to COVID-19, as shown in the below tweet sharing an article about a Chinese shipping vessel carrying fire ants into Yokohama:
That they would go so far as to add poison fire ants to the Wuhan Virus (novel coronavirus)…We have no idea what they’ll be carrying in next! We really shouldn’t have anything to do with China!!
#NovelCoronaVirus #WuhanVirus #ChineseDontCometoJapan
Clearly, popular names for the disease which use China or the Chinese region of Wuhan are being used within in Japan, as elsewhere. Some tweets also stress more than simply cutting off the influx of Chinese tourists into Japan:
#ChineseDontCometoJapan
Spreading Corona all over the place! Chinese guys, don’t come here!!
Let’s also expel those guys who are living in Japan!
In other words, this user is calling the expulsion of all ethnic Han Chinese from Japan. This would involve an incredible degree of ethnic cleansing since nearly a million people of Chinese descent live in Japan as citizens or otherwise. This is easily the largest non-Yamato group in Japan.
Of course, tweets with this hashtag go much further than even this, often outright and unabashedly engaging in the demonization of the Chinese people. Here we see one which marks Chinese individuals as innately dirty carriers of disease, whose very presence on the Earth reflects a general danger to mankind:
From every small misfortune to every big misfortune related to Corona, it’s all the fault of China
China, apologize to the whole world and then get off this Earth!
Speaking of apologies, just who is it who’s really scheming to take advantage of this chaos in order to monopolize 5G?
Seriously, please just perish.
#ChineseDontCometoJapan
#DontForgiveChina
The #ChineseDontCometoJapan hashtag, so easily read as xenophobic, was soon reported on in the Japanese and foreign press. The fact that the hashtag was trending made for an easily example of discrimination against Chinese individuals within Japan during the Corona crisis. Despite the extreme nature of many of the tweets featuring this hashtag, the labelling of it as “xenophobic” has itself created some (predicatable) backlash from those who simply believed it to be a rational attempt to protect Japan.
Just what exactly about ‘#ChineseDontCometoJapan’ is discriminatory? In actuality, isn’t it true that the first wave of the Wuhan pneumonia virus was a Chinese direct delivery from the tons of Chinese tourists who came here for the Lunar New Year?
#ExclusiveScoop
The tweets featured above are taken from February through the day of this writing (June 18th, 2020), marking this an ongoing trend. Additionally, via conducting a very small-scale survey of selected tweets produced by simply searching the less-inflammatory words of “China” and “Corona” in Japanese on Twitter, I found the following results.
| Tweet does the following: | Number of tweets | Percentage |
| Blames China for the Corona virus or related situations | 29 | 58% |
| Invokes conspiracy theory | 7 | 14% |
| Is openly racist towards Chinese people | 2 | 4% |
| Is supportive or speaks positively towards China or Chinese individuals | 8 | 16% |
| Speaks of both China and Corona but is ambiguous or does not make judgment calls | 13 | 26% |
| Expresses worry about the perception of Japanese and other Asians caused by China and the virus outbreak | 2 | 4% |
| Is anonymous | 39 | 78% |
While those who take to Twitter in order to express an opinion regarding the topic of COVID and China can be assumed to usually have a strong statement they wish to make, 26% of these tweets were simply noting things as they developed without any major opinion or seeming message in mind. 58%, however, directly placed blame on China for the the Corona crisis (although the fact that these tweets reference both concepts together might indicate that this topic selects for such individuals to a degree, although not to the extent that searching for “Wuhan Virus” or using the #ChineseDontCometoJapan hashtag might do, both of which would likely have higher incidences of open racism against Chinese people than the small 4% found here).
14% of these tweets, however, were written in order to try to pushback against discrimination against Chinese citizens over COVID, or even to praise China for its seeming success in containing the disease at home.
Also worthy of note is the aforementioned trend towards anonymity. The vast majority of these tweets came from accounts where the user neither provide their real name nor photograph. Comparatively, at least one study found that on average 6% of English language Twitter accounts were fully anonymous, and 20% partially anonymous (revealing only part of the user’s full name). By contrast, studies have shown over three-quarters of Japanese Twitter users prefer anonymity.
Not Just Online – Real-Life Xenophobia During COVID
Despite the stereotype of anti-Chinese rhetoric being cordoned off in online spaces occupied by “keyboard warrior”-style netto-uyo, the COVID crisis has seen a number of controversial events targeting Chinese and other perceived “Others” have occurred outside of the online world.
In January 2020, directly after the first COVID-19 case had been confirmed within Japanese borders, the owner of a confectionary shop in Hakone posted a sign outside his door in incoherent Chinese (including what can be read as “absurd ethnic group” and “makes one feel annoyed”) warning off Chinese customers. That same month, a camera captured a Japanese server yelling “China! Out!” at a tourist in a restaurant in the Ito Peninsula. The restaurant later stated that it was refusing Chinese and South-East Asian customers over fears of the virus.
Also in February, a Tokyo ramen restaurant attracted the ire of online commentators when it announced it would begin serving only Japanese customers. In March, various restaurants in Yokohama’s famed Chinatown received anonymous letters filled with hate speech, such as “Chinese people are garbage! Bacteria! Evil! Troublesome! Get out of Japan now!!” A global poll by UK market research company Ipsos MORI from early February also showed that 28% of Japanese respondents would “avoid people of Chinese origin or appearance.”
Never-Ending Narratives
Anti-Chinese sentiment, it seems, has seeped even more onto the offline world. For those for whom China was already marked as “anti-Japanese,” this extreme crisis we now find ourselves in is simply a tipping point. Perceptions of a China bent on disrupting and harming Japan have become reified by a “Chinese” disease entering the country via seemingly uncontrolled cross-border flows. (Of course, there are in fact controls, and much of the spread has come from Japanese nationals returning from other countries.)
The reality of actual CCP designs on Japan and elsewhere, which deserve scrutiny, are not truly what matters here. For those like the man I encountered for whom the granting of rights to the Ainu was merely a Chinese ploy towards the destruction of Japan, Chinese villainy was already clear. From his perspective, like that of many of the Japanese net-right, China stands in direct opposition to Japan ever truly recovering from World War II; in a sense, COVID-19 is just another Chinese attempt to disrupt Japanese unity.
All these narratives about China were already in place, being constantly reiterated on online forums and YouTube videos. It simply took a crisis of this magnitude to fan the flames into an ever-larger, ever-more-visible fire.
Main Sources
Caroline Rose (2000) ‘Patriotism is not taboo’: nationalism in China and Japan and implications for Sino–Japanese relations, Japan Forum, 12:2
Karl Gustafsson (2015) Identity and recognition: remembering and forgetting the post-war in Sino-Japanese relations, The Pacific Review, 28:1
Sakamoto, Rumi (March 7, 2011). ‘Koreans, Go Home!’ Internet Nationalism in Contemporary Japan as a Digitally Mediated Subculture. The Asia-Pacific Journal, Volume 9 | Issue 10 | Number 2
Pyle, K. (1982). The Future of Japanese Nationality: An Essay in Contemporary History. Journal of Japanese Studies, 8(2), 223-263.
